Press and Information Division

PRESS RELEASE No 41/02

3 May 2002

Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-177/01

Jégo-Quéré et Cie v Commission

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF LEGAL RIGHTS FOR EUROPEAN CITIZENS AND BUSINESSES, REDEFINES THE RULES GOVERNING INDIVIDUAL ACCESS TO THE COMMUNITY COURTS

The concept of individual concern within the meaning of the EC Treaty should no longer be interpreted in a way that limits the right of individuals to challenge Community regulations to exceptional cases. That concept must be redefined as follows: A natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure of general application that concerns him directly if the measure in question affects his legal position, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or by imposing obligations on him.

Jégo-Quéré et Cie S.A. is a French fishing company operating on a regular basis in the waters south of Ireland. It owns four fishing boats over 30 metres in length and uses nets having a mesh of 80 mm, which have been banned by a new Community regulation.

It applied to the Court of First Instance for annulment of two provisions of the regulation in question, which require fishing vessels operating in certain defined zones to use nets having a minimum mesh for beam trawling.

The Commission argued that the Court of First Instance should declare the action inadmissible. According to the EC Treaty, “Any natural or legal person may ... institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former”. Whilst not denying that the contested provisions are of direct concern to Jégo-Quéré,it claimed that the applicant is not individually concerned, inasmuch as the rules governing mesh sizes apply equally to all operators fishing in the Celtic Sea and not just to that operator.

The Commission argued that, on the basis of the criteria previously developed by the case-law of the Community courts, the Court of First Instance was bound to find that the applicant could not be regarded as individually concerned within the meaning of the EC Treaty and that the action should therefore be dismissed as inadmissible.

According to current case-law, a measure of general application may be contested by an individual only if that measure affects his legal position by reason of certain attributes peculiar to him or by reason of a factual situation which differentiates him from all other persons.

The Court of First Instance finds that the effect of that case-law is to prevent many individuals from challenging measures of general application which directly affect their legal position.

The Court considers in that regard that none of the other possible procedural routes constitutes a suitable vehicle for challenging the legality of a Community measure.

It is unacceptable that, where no implementing measures exist at national level in respect of which an action may be brought before the national courts, an individual should be forced knowingly to infringe Community law in order to gain access to a national court and thereby, as the case may be, to procure a reference to the EC Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the point at issue.

The criteria for bringing an action for compensation, which is designed to make good damage caused by the Community, are such as to prevent the Community judicature from fulfilling its task of reviewing, in all its aspects, the legality of the measure in issue.

The Court of First Instance points out that, according to the case-law of the EC Court of Justice, access to the courts is one of the fundamental elements of a community based on the rule of law, as guaranteed by the legal order based on the EC Treaty, which has established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of measures adopted by the institutions. The Court of Justice has held that the right to an effective remedy before a court of competent jurisdiction is based on the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and on the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. That right is reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 2000.

The Court of First Instance therefore rules that, in order for individuals to be properly protected by the courts, a natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure of general application that concerns him directly, if the measure in question affects his legal position, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or by imposing obligations on him. The number and the position of other persons who are likewise affected by the measure, or who may be so, are of no relevance in that regard.

In the present case, the contested provisions undoubtedly impose obligations on Jégo-Quéré, requiring it to use in its fishing operations nets of a particular mesh size.

It is therefore both individually and directly concerned by the contested provisions. Consequently, the objection of inadmissibility raised by the Commission must be dismissed. The case continues.

Reminder: An appeal, limited to questions of law, may be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities against the decision of the Court of First Instance within two months of the date of service.

Unofficial document for media use only; not binding on the Court of First Instance.

Available in all the Community languages.

For the full text of the judgment, please consult our Internet page
www.curia.eu.int  at approximately 3 pm today.

For further information please contact Mrs Ulrike Städtler
Tel: (00 352) 43 03 24 09; Fax: (00 352) 43 03 27 34